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Discussant's Response to
Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon
Robert L. Grinaker
University of Houston
Although I am pleased to comment on Donald Georgen's paper, I also have
something of a problem because, to a large extent, I agree w i t h most of the things
he has to say. It's a little difficult to discuss a paper that I wish I had written
myself. Hence, I would like my remarks to be considered complementary to,
rather than critical of, those presented i n the paper. M y discussion w i l l be directed
to the following specific topics:
A . Under the broad area of auditor's responsibility, I shall make a few
comments on management fraud and illegal payments.
B. I shall address the following three additional topics:
1. Evaluation of traditional auditing procedures.
2. Understanding the client's business.
3. Scientific research design—a prototype for auditing procedures.
Auditor's Responsibility for Management Fraud
Let me first comment that D o n Georgen makes a very useful distinction between employee and management fraud. Furthermore, I agree w i t h h i m that
most instances of management fraud are "performance" based rather than involved
i n the direct theft of assets. However, certain classical cases—notably McKessonRobbins—did involve massive thefts of company assets.
I further agree that the profession is becoming increasingly aware that it has
significant responsibility for the discovery of management fraud. I also am convinced that this awareness stems principally from public expectations which are
reflected i n actions of regulatory agencies and the courts. T h e processes appear to
be by-passing the auditor, thus posing some significant dangers. T o me, the
danger is that the auditor's responsibility for fraud losses may be completely disassociated from financial statements and their fair presentation. In my judgment,
the only perspective that makes sense i n defining the auditor's responsibility for
fraud is its relationship to the fair presentation of the financial statements. In this
regard, our professional literature, characterized i n the paper as ambiguous, has
been something less than helpful. Consider the following from A u d S E C ' s
Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards N o . 1:
In m a k i n g the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware of
the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresentations by management, or both. The auditor recognizes that
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fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on the financial statements, and his examination, made i n accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, gives consideration to this possibility. (§ 110.05)
T h e foregoing seems to be a very clear statement right on issue. F r a u d is identified as a source of error and the auditor is aware of the fact that any material
error, including fraud, can have an impact on the fairness of the financial statements. If this be so, the auditor's opinion and his responsibility are affected. If
the statement stopped here, I would conclude that the auditor's responsibility for
fraud is no different than for any other source of misstatement. I could then
argue w i t h force that, although the auditor must conduct his examination w i t h
due professional care, he is not a guarantor. Hence, despite an examination conducted i n accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, material error
may nevertheless remain undetected. Whether the source of the misstatement is
fraud or honest error should be irrelevant.
Unfortunatly, A u d S E C ' s statement continues, and like negative assurance, the
meaning of an otherwise clear statement is considerably blunted. T h e next three
sentences read as follows:
However, the ordinary examination directed to the expression of an opinion
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed, and cannot
be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar irregularities,
although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the discovery of
deliberate misrepresentations by management is usually more closely associated with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. T h e responsibility of the
independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to clients and other) arises only when such failure clearly results
from failure to comply w i t h generally accepted auditing standards.
W h a t are these latter sentences attempting to say? A r e they saying that the auditor
is not responsible for detecting immaterial fraud? O r , are they saying that the
auditor's responsibility for detecting error arising from fraud is different than for
other kinds of error? F o r example, is the responsibility different i n the case of an
honest error arising from the failure to account for obsolete inventory compared
to an error arising from management deceit? If so, the auditor's opinion should
be redrafted. O n the other hand, the statement may simply be pointing out that
the auditor is not infallible. Hence, errors of any k i n d may remain undetected
even though the auditor has conducted an examination i n accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 1
In any event, the statement as now drafted is ambiguous. Hence, any position
inferred from this statement may be totally right or totally wrong. A clearer
statement may not help, but I believe it would have a better chance than the
current one.
A s to whether the auditor should specifically search for fraud, or any other
source of error, I would assert that the audit mode should always be applicable to
the circumstances. I believe that this statement simply generalizes from D o n
Georgen's position that his firm would audit i n the fraud mode only i n warranted
circumstances—i.e., where the economic and other conditions may be conducive
toward fraudulent activities. Rightly so, extensive tests are made i n the fraud
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mode only i n those circumstances where fraud is likely. But surely the general
position also is right; i.e., extensive special tests of any k i n d should be warranted
by the circumstances. F o r example, if I am auditing a highly technical industry,
characterized by ever-changing product specifications, I w i l l certainly apply rather
special, and perhaps costly, tests for inventory obsolescence. Such tests w o u l d be
totally unwarranted i n other circumstances. I make this point not to be pedantic,
but to support the position that fraud should be classified together w i t h all other
possible source of financial statement error.
The Auditor's Responsibility for Illegal Payments
W i t h respect to the auditor's responsibility for illegal payments, I hesitate to
speak other than to confess my confusion. I am not greatly helped by recent
court decisions or by statements of S E C Chairman H i l l . I could, perhaps, understand the auditor's responsibility if it were related to either of the following
circumstances:
a) If failure to disclose such payments would cause financial statements to
be materially misstated, or
b) If the auditor had witnessed a crime and the failure to disclose were
viewed as a conspiracy to cover-up.
Thus, I find myself i n agreement with D o n Georgen that our responsibilities i n
this area remain unclear. In the meantime, I believe his firm's position is exactly
appropriate—i.e., audit i n the "illegal payment mode" i n those circumstances
where illegal payments are likely to have occurred.
Evaluation of Traditional Auditing Procedures
In any consideration of the auditor's responsibility for the discovery of fraud,
traditional auditing procedures warrant some attention. A number of traditional
auditing procedures are directed to fraud detection. F o r example, since 1940, as
the consequence of a classic case of massive management fraud, at least a portion
of almost every audit is conducted i n the fraud mode. In my judgment, a critical
review of traditional auditing procedures would prove fruitful i n suggesting
modifications which could materially enhance the probability of discovering management fraud. I would like to use confirmation procedures as a caged example.
In discussing auditing procedures, we often speak of independent confirmation, i n which we represent that testimony is communicated directly from an
independent third party to the auditor. T o assure such independence, we take
some pains with the processes involved. A s a personal indication of these concerns, I once received some pointed criticism as a young auditor from a partner
who observed my intention to m a i l out confirmation letters i n the client's envelopes. Never—before or since—have I heard such a lucid explanation of the
importance of assuring independence i n the confirmation process. N o w , i n the
Equity F u n d i n g case, we find revealed another significant "hole" i n the process
of independent confirmation. A l t h o u g h E q u i t y F u n d i n g was replete w i t h questionable auditing, the case also contains some significant lessons.
Y o u w i l l recall i n the case that the auditor attempted to confirm the existence
of securities i n the custody of a bank. However, he got burned by a very simple
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ploy, totally unrelated to such traditional controls as "using the right envelopes"
or "delivering of confirmation requests directly to the postal authorities." T h e
special A I C P A Committee investigating Equity F u n d i n g describes the ploy as
follows:
A t the end of 1972 the auditors' request for confirmation of certain securities represented as being held i n safekeeping by the bank was addressed by
company personnel to a mail drop set up under a name similar to the bank
so company personnel would receive the request, sign the confirmation and
return it to the auditors. 2
I wonder, are traditional auditing procedures adequate with respect to this matter?
T h e special committee concluded on the issue with the following statement:
W h i l e this points up the need for auditors to ascertain that valid addresses
are used, such a step is already a customary and integral part of confirmation procedures. 3
Frankly, I would like to see the empirical evidence which supports the foregoing
conclusion. M y own evidence, while admittedly limited and informally gathered,
indicates that tests of the validity of confirmation addresses generally is limited to
data contained i n the client's records. If so, I suggest that such tests are inadequate to assure independent confirmation.
In summary, based on my admittedly caged example, I suggest that traditional
auditing procedures be subjected to continuing critical review on two fronts:
first, we should test the logical connection between each link i n the evidential
chain, and second, we should study subsequently discovered misstatements not
revealed i n the auditing process. If auditing weaknesses are revealed, normal
audit procedures should be corrected.
Understanding the Client's Business
A so-called "through the business approach" has been discussed i n auditing
literature, and particularly by Touche, for a number of years. I am pleased to note
that the client investigation routine discussed by M r . Georgen places special emphasis on "understanding the client's business." I have come to believe that
thorough prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is absolutely essential to
effective auditing and, hence, to the discovery of material error—whether the
source is fraud or an honest mistake.
M y conviction on this point finds clear support i n philosophical literature
dealing w i t h the theory of knowledge. Marhenke states as follows, " Y o u cannot
devise an observation test until you k n o w the meaning of the sentence you are
going to test." 4 F o r example, w i t h respect to auditing, consider the following
sentence: " T h e inventory value on the balance sheet is fairly stated." T o test this
sentence, the auditor must know not only the general meaning of inventory and
inventory accounting, but also the special environment i n which this particular
inventory is contained. Many special problems such as identification, physical
condition, or obsolescence may be involved. If such special problems do exist,
they form part of the meaning of the sentence to be tested.
In discussing the nature of scientific inquiry, Susan Stebbing reinforces the
point w i t h the following statement:
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A n examination of the examples we have given shows that a considerable
amount of previous knowledge relevant to the situation is required before
a problem can even be stated. Still more knowledge is required i n order
that fruitful suggestions as to its solution should occur to the thinker. 5
One may rightfully question why I a m belaboring such an obvious point.
Consider the following statement by the S E C i n A S R N o . 173 issued i n July, 1975:
Another lesson appears . . . where the auditors accepted assertions by management concerning the special circumstances of the business involved
although presentation of the supposed results presented unusual accounting
and auditing problems. In considerable measure this occurred because the
auditors were not sufficiendy familiar w i t h the business context to assess
the representations of management. Auditors should be particularly careful
when the client asserts that special circumstances require unusual accounting or auditing solutions and should either possess or avail themselves of
sufficient industry knowledge to judge the substance of the situation.
In A S R N o . 174, under a caption entitled " H F K ' s Understanding of Stirling
Homex's Business" is the following statement:
H F K , i n the opinion of the Commission did not fully understand the
funding provisions applicable to Stirling Homex's operations under the
H U D turnkey program and d i d not seek such advice.
As was asserted by the S E C i n these two A S R ' s , failure to understand the client's
business accounted for the failure to obtain competent evidence from w h i c h appropriate inferences could be drawn. More fundamentally, the auditors i n these
cases could not devise the proper observation tests because either (1) they d i d not
k n o w the meaning of the sentences they were trying to test, or (2) they d i d not
know enough even to formulate appropriate propositions to be tested.
In my judgment, prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is so fundamental to inquiry that steps should be taken to assure that such knowledge pervades the entire audit team. M u c h prerequisite knowledge is provided to younger
staff members by recent university education and i n follow-on staff training programs. However, I wonder h o w many staff training programs are directed to
specific industries and specific clients. I assert that inclusion of such programs i n
the training budgets of accounting firms w o u l d be cost-beneficial. Although I
have no evidence i n support of my assertion, I believe the concept can and should
be empirically tested.
Scientific Research Design—A Prototype for Auditing Procedures
Georgen points out i n his paper that auditing procedures—particularly those
procedures directed to the discovery of management fraud—are i n the development state. A s a matter of fact, all human knowledge is tentative and, hence, is
subject to continuing mid-course corrections. Auditors w i l l continue to learn
both from past mistakes and from research. A s we learn more, auditing procedures
w i l l continue to become more effective i n the discovery of fraud and other error.
Experience, of course, is a great teacher. A s some sage so wisely stated, " F o o l
me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." T h e SAS's are replete w i t h
auditing lessons learned from experience. However, the lessons of experience are
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often bitter pills to swallow. Hopefully, therefore, we w i l l come, more and more,
to rely on research for the development of auditing procedures. Research already
has proved fruitful i n the development of opinion modifications, understanding
the application of statistical inference to auditing, and understanding the impact
of the behavioral sciences on auditing.
Compared to most other disciplines which evolve through research, auditing
is unique i n that a significant portion of the discipline itself comprises a system
of inquiry. Thus, the principles of scientific research design stand as a readymade prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. In my judgment, a
significant positive step i n the development of auditing procedures would be
recognition of this relationship by an authoritative professional body—say,
AudSEC.
Every developing discipline has found that its problems begin to yield solutions when the methods of organized inquiry are applied. W e are just beginning
to tackle accounting and auditing problems i n this fashion. Despite the many
difficulties involved i n getting started, a number of problems are yielding solutions. In my judgment, one of the blessings of the current high demand for
accounting education is the concurrent demand for accounting doctorates—young
people specifically trained to be researchers. T h e important point for auditing as
a discipline is that research education implies the existence of a body of knowledge
specifically about the research process. Because auditors, like trained researchers,
are involved i n a system of inquiry, I assert that, if all auditors were specifically
trained i n the general methods of research design, auditing procedures and their
ability to detect fraud and error w o u l d be significantly improved. Although I
have no evidence to support my assertion, I am convinced that the concept can
and should be empirically tested.
In Summary
In summary I would suggest the following:
1. F r a u d (and perhaps illegal payments) should be viewed by the profession
as simply another possible source of financial statement error w i t h responsibility and consequences no different than for any other source of
error. Auditors w o u l d then be i n a better position to address with force
the questions of due professional care vs. professional infallibility.
2. So-called traditional auditing procedures should be subject to continuing
review for logical "holes." Such review should assure m a x i m u m effectiveness of normal auditing procedures to detect fraud and other errors.
3. Thorough understanding of the client's business is an essential prerequisite to effective auditing and, hence, to the detection of fraud and other
error. I further suggest that staff training be geared to developing the
means of obtaining such an understanding by every member of the
audit team.
4. Because auditing is a system of inquiry, scientific research design should
be adopted as a prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. I
further suggest that all auditors be trained i n the fundamentals of
research design.

Footnotes
1. In May, 1976,

A u d S E C announced the issuance of an exposure draft entitled The
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